Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme Court\u27s Constitutional Decisions: Accomodation of Rights in Conflict by Nathanson, J. Edmond
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 2 Article 4
Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme
Court's Constitutional Decisions: Accomodation
of Rights in Conflict
J. Edmond Nathanson
Copyright c 1986 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
J. Edmond Nathanson, Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions:
Accomodation of Rights in Conflict, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 331 (1986),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss2/4
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CONTRADICT THE
SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS:
ACCOMMODATION OF RIGHTS IN CONFLICT
J. EDMOND NATHANSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Two decades ago, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,1 the Supreme Court
upheld a federal statute, enacted under section five of the four-
teenth amendment,2 prohibiting state English literacy require-
ments for voters. The Court's approval of this use of the four-
teenth amendment enforcement power was somewhat surprising in
light of the Court's rejection of a fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection challenge to literacy requirements several years earlier.3
The Court supported its decision with a sweeping rationale. Ac-
cording to the Court, Congress possesses plenary legislative author-
ity under the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, authority
unbounded by the scope of fourteenth amendment rights articu-
lated in prior Court decisions.4 The Court maintained that Con-
gress not only could devise remedies for judicially-declared viola-
tions of the fourteenth amendment, but also could decide for itself
whether a state had violated that amendment.5
In his dissenting opinion in Morgan, Justice Harlan suggested
that the Court's recognition of congressional power to interpret the
* Law clerk to Judge Laurence H. Silberman, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. B.A., 1982, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1985, Harvard
University. An earlier version of this Article was prepared under the helpful supervision of
Professor Paul Bator.
1. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
3. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
4. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49.
5. Id. at 652-56. This interpretation of the fourteenth amendment enforcement power is
particularly significant because of the broad scope of potential constitutional violations cov-
ered by the amendment and thus by the enforcement power. Section one of the amendment
includes the frequently-invoked due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the
privileges and immunities clause. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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substance of the fourteenth amendment, in a manner inconsistent
with the Court's interpretation, compromised the principle of judi-
cial supremacy enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.' Justice Harlan
contended that Congress could not revise or contradict a constitu-
tional decision of the Court through ordinary legislation, and he
noted that Congress could use the power recognized by the major-
ity to curb fourteenth amendment rights.7 The majority's response
to this argument was oblique. In a footnote, Justice Brennan ar-
gued that, while Congress could exercise the enforcement power to
expand judicially-created rights, it could not "exercise discretion in
the other direction . . . to restrict, abrogate, or dilute [fourteenth
amendment] guarantees."' This assertion, which has become
known as the one-way "ratchet" theory, has provided a continuing
source of controversy.
Whatever their intrinsic appeal, Justice Harlan's views concern-
ing judicial supremacy have not prevailed. With the-notable excep-
tion of Oregon v. Mitchell,9 decided in 1970, th&oSupreme Court
consistently has upheld congressional efforts to expand fourteenth
amendment rights beyond their previous judicial .confines.10 To
date, however, the Court has had no occasion to test the limits of
Justice Brennan's ratchet footnote. Despite a wealth of scholarly
commentary on Morgan and its progeny," the precise contours of
6. See id. at 666-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803)).
7. Id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204-05
(1970) (opinion of Harlan, J., elaborating on this argument).
8. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
9. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
10. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976).
11. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTrrUTONAL LAW §§ 5-12 to 5-15 (1978); Burt, Mi-
randa and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Cohen, Congressional
Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Cox,
The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Cox, Constitutional Determinations]; Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adju-
dication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Cox, Human Rights]; Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional Power under Sec-
tion Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72
Nw. U.L. REv. 656 (1977); Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Consti-
tutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
The Human Life Bill, discussed infra notes 163-77 and accompanying text, triggered a
second wave of commentary on Congress' fourteenth amendment enforcement power. See,
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Congress' authority to revise the Supreme Court's constitutional
decisions remains unclear.
This Article examines the outer boundaries of this congressional
revisory authority. First, the Article briefly summarizes the doctri-
nal framework established by the Court in the Morgan line of
cases. The Article proceeds to evaluate the efforts of commentators
to explain the Morgan doctrine and to reconcile it with Marbury v.
Madison. Based on this analysis, the Article presents a modified
theory of congressional power under Morgan, a theory which em-
phasizes Congress' special role in accommodating rights in conflict.
The Article then tests the limits of this "rights in conflict" theory
by applying it to two proposals that have engendered considerable
controversy: the Equal Access Act,12 a recent congressional enact-
ment that prohibits federal funding of state secondary schools that
do not accord religious groups the same access to school facilities
granted to other extracurricular groups; and the Human Life Bill,13
a proposal raised in Congress that sought to reverse the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 4 by defining fetuses as "persons"
protected by the fourteenth amendment. The Article concludes
that the rights in conflict theory offers a convincing basis for Con-
gress to assume an enhanced role in arbitrating vital constitutional
disputes and thereby to strike a more desirable constitutional bal-
ance with the Supreme Court than the balance that prevails under
the status quo.
e.g., Emerson, The Power of Congress to Change Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme
Court: The Human Life Bill, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 129 (1982); Estreicher, Congressional Power
and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L.
REv. 333 (1982); Galebach, A Human Life Statute, 7 HUMAN LIFE REv. 5 (1981); Pilchen,
Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional
Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 337 (1984);
see also Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Section Five Action: The Fallacy of Re-
verse Incorporation, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1969 (1984) (discussing various uses of the enforce-
ment power).
12. Education for Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, §§ 801-805, 98 Stat. 1267,
1302-04 (1984) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A §§ 4071-4074 (West Supp. 1985)).
13. See S. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S225 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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II. THE Morgan DOCTRINE
A. Katzenbach v. Morgan
In Morgan, voters from New York City challenged the constitu-
tionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,'" which
prohibited states from applying English literacy requirements to
voters who had completed the sixth grade at "American-flag"
schools where instructors taught in languages other than English.
In practical effect, the statute enfranchised most of New York's
Puerto Rican population by suspending New York's literacy re-
quirement. The plaintiffs argued that the Court could not sustain
section 4(e) as a measure enforcing the fourteenth amendment be-
cause the Court previously had held that English literacy require-
ments do not per se violate the fourteenth amendment equal pro-
tection clause.16
The Supreme Court rejected this attempt to tie congressional
authority to judicially-declared violations of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and instead framed the issue before it broadly: "Without re-
gard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection
Clause itself nullifies New York's English literacy requirement...
could Congress prohibit the enforcement of the state law by legis-
lating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?' 17 Citing histori-
cal evidence suggesting that the fourteenth amendment primarily
was designed to enlarge congressional power, the Court held that
the enforcement power granted Congress "discretion" akin to the
discretion it enjoys under its article I powers. 8 The Court indi-
cated that it would review congressional exercises of the enforce-
ment power under the deferential standard of McCulloch v. Mary-
land: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
15. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(e) (1982)).
16. See 384 U.S. at 648-49 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959)).
17. Id. at 649.
18. See id. at 648-51 & nn.7-8.
334 [Vol. 27:331
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plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 19
Faced with the scant legislative record accompanying the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, the Court identified two alternative theories to
affirm section 4(e) of the Act as "plainly adapted" to the ends of
the enforcement power. 20 The Court's first theory was that Con-
gress' extension of the franchise served a remedial purpose in this
case by preventing actual or potential discrimination against New
York's Puerto Rican minority in the provision of public ser-
vices-discrimination that clearly would violate the equal protec-
tion clause. 21 The Court's second, more controversial theory was
that Congress itself could have balanced the state interests prof-
fered in support of English literacy requirements against the inter-
ests of Puerto Ricans in exercising their voting rights, and it could
have concluded that literacy requirements in this context violated
the equal protection clause.22 The Court concluded that indepen-
dent judicial concurrence with Congress' interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment was not necessary to uphold an exercise of the
fourteenth amendment enforcement power. As long as Congress
respected the ratchet,23 according to the majority opinion, the
Court needed only to "perceive a basis" for Congress' interpreta-
tion of the amendment.24
The Court in Morgan also considered whether Congress' action
itself violated the fifth amendment's equal protection component
by denying non-English-speaking citizens educated in foreign
schools the voting rights granted to those educated in "American-
flag" schools. Again, the Court employed a deferential standard of
19. Id. at 650 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)). The
Court identified this standard as "[t]he basic test ... concerning the express powers of
Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the States." Id. at 651 (quoting South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
20. Id. at 652.
21. Id. at 652-53. The Court noted that the right to vote is "'preservative of all rights.'"
Id. at 652 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). Extension of the
franchise, according to the Court, would provide the Puerto Rican community with "en-
hanced political power" to guard against discriminatory treatment in the provision of public
services. Id.
22. Id. at 653-56.
23. See id. at 651 n.10; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
24. 384 U.S. at 656.
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review. 25 Characterizing the enfranchisement as a "reform" mea-
sure, the Court refused to declare such remedial legislation uncon-
stitutional simply because "'it might have gone farther than it
did.' ",26 The Court concluded that the perceived differences be-
tween American and non-American schools provided a rational ba-
sis for Congress' distinction.27
B. Subsequent Decisions
The Court's application of the deferential McCulloch standard
in Morgan suggests that legislation enacted under the fourteenth
amendment enforcement power is subject both to the "internal"
limitations applicable to congressional actions under a particular
grant of legislative power and the "external" limitations applicable
to congressional actions in general. To satisfy the internal limita-
tions, legislation must be within the broad delegation of authority
and must be "plainly adapted" to its ends. To satisfy the external
limitations, on the other hand, legislation must be consistent with
the Bill of Rights and other constitutional restrictions on congres-
sional power.
In subsequent cases, the Court consistently has evaluated the in-
ternal limitations on the enforcement power under a permissive ra-
tionality standard. Instead of substituting its judgment for Con-
gress' perception of various measures and their necessity, the
Court has sought only to "perceive a basis" for congressional deter-
minations.2 8 In Fullilove v. Klutznick,29 for example, the Court al-
lowed Congress to use its fourteenth amendment enforcement
power to establish affirmative action quotas for minority business
participation in public construction projects, even though the
Court previously had held that the fourteenth amendment prohib-
ited only purposeful discrimination."
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26. 384 U.S. at 657 (quoting Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929)).
27. Id. at 657-58.
28. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
29. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
30. Id. at 476-78. The Court also has applied this deferential standard to the internal
limitations associated with the fifteenth amendment enforcement power. In City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), for example, the Court held that Congress could use its
fifteenth amendment enforcement power to ban electoral changes that have a disparate
[Vol. 27:331
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Similarly, in Oregon v. Mitchell,"' although the Justices were di-
vided badly on other issues, every Justice agreed that Congress
could impose a nationwide ban on literacy tests for voters.2 The
Court explained Mitchell and other post-Morgan decisions largely
under the less controversial "remedial" theory it propounded in
Morgan.s3 As a practical matter, however, these decisions may be
regarded as establishing a more radical proposition: Congress pos-
sesses power to expand constitutional protections beyond the
boundaries established by the Court, to create breathing space
around core constitutional rights or to legislate prophylactically
against potential or speculative constitutional violations, as long as
its measures bear a plausible connection to the ends and values of
the fourteenth amendment.
The Court's treatment of the external limitations in Morgan has
been far less clear. In Morgan, the Court applied a highly deferen-
tial standard in reviewing the extension of the franchise for consis-
tency with equal protection, partially because the Court viewed the
enactment as a "reform" measure. The same might be said for
the Court's decision to uphold the affirmative action program in
Fullilove,5 although the Court in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke36 had appeared to apply a more stringent stan-
dard of review to such programs.
A comparison of Oregon v. Mitchell37 and a later decision, Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer,3 8 demonstrates even more pointedly the confu-
sion prevailing with respect to external limitations on Congress'
fourteenth amendment enforcement power. In Mitchell, five Jus-
tices declared that Congress could not exercise its fourteenth
amendment power to lower the voting age in state elections to
eighteen. Although some commentators have regarded this holding
as a pronouncement concerning the internal limitations on the
impact on minority groups, even though the Court previously had held that the fifteenth
amendment banned only purposeful discrimination. See id. at 173-78.
31. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
32. See id. at 118-19.
33. See, e.g., id. at 143-44 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
34. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35. See 448 U.S. at 476-78; supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
36. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
37. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
38. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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enforcement power,3 9 at least four of the five Justices who voted to
strike down the provision arguably based their opinions on the ex-
ternal limitations40 imposed by the constitutional grant of power to
the states to fix voting qualifications.4' In Bitzer, by contrast, the
Court upheld congressional abrogation of the states' eleventh
amendment immunity.42 Noting that the fourteenth amendment
represented a "shift in the federal-state balance," the Court held
that the eleventh amendment was "necessarily limited" by subse-
quent congressional exercises of its enforcement power under that
amendment.43 Taken together, Morgan, Fullilove, Mitchell, and
Bitzer do not indicate clearly whether external limitations, such as
the Bill of Rights, constrain legislation enacted under the four-
teenth amendment enforcement power as stringently as they con-
strain legislation enacted pursuant to other congressional powers.
The Morgan ratchet footnote 4 presents a particular problem be-
cause it can be construed either as an expression of internal limita-
tions or as an expression of external limitations. On one hand, Jus-
tice Brennan's opinion intimated that congressional acts
purporting to curb Court-articulated rights would not be "appro-
priate" legislation "enforcing" the fourteenth amendment.4 5 This
suggestion of internal limitations is puzzling because most observ-
ers would regard the notion of "enforcement" as broad enough to
embrace the drawing of reasonable limitations to accommodate
competing interests. If Congress really possesses power to interpret
the substance of the fourteenth amendment, no obvious rationale
readily explains why Congress may expand but not contract Court-
established rights. On the other hand, an example offered in Mor-
gan supports the opposite inference that the ratchet embodies
39. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 11, at 603 n.3 (characterizing Mitchell as an "ultra vires"
decision).
40. See 400 U.S. at 124-25 (opinion of Black, J.); id. at 287-88 (opinion of Stewart, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.). Justice Stewart's statement that "even though
general constitutional power clearly exists, Congress may not overstep the letter or spirit of
any constitutional restriction in the exercise of that power" buttresses the conclusion that
his opinion rests on external rather than internal limitations. Id. at 287.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
42. 427 U.S. at 456.
43. Id. at 455, 456.
44. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10; see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
45. See id.
[Vol. 27:331
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external limitations. According to Justice Brennan, a hypothetical
congressional act authorizing the states to establish racially segre-
gated schools would be invalid because the equal protection clause
"of its own force prohibits such. . . laws. '46 Such an operation of
the equal protection clause (really the equal protection component
of the fifth amendment due process clause) clearly would be exter-
nal because it would rest on the Bill of Rights.47 Since Morgan,
however, the Court has not decided a case that would compel elab-
oration of the ratchet theory or its theoretical foundations.
III. THEORIES ABOUT THE BASIS AND LIMITS OF Morgan
Congress generally has avoided constitutional confrontations
with the Court that would test the ratchet theory.4 8 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court's recognition in the Morgan line of cases of
congressional power to interpret the Constitution, subject only to
deferential judicial review, has troubled many leading commenta-
tors.49 These commentators have questioned whether this power
ultimately is compatible with the declaration in Marbury v.
Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." 50 In part, these con-
cerns may arise from doubts about the analytical strength or en-
during quality of the ratchet theory-which was, after all, merely
46. Id.
47. But see Note, supra note 11, at 1983-89 (questioning whether such a limitation is
"external" to the enforcement power).
48. For example, the Equal Access Act was intended not to challenge, but rather to ex-
tend, the rationale of a Supreme Court decision, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. The Act, however, contradicted several lower
court decisions in which the courts had distinguished Widmar.
One instance in which Congress apparently did seek to "overrule" a Supreme Court con-
stitutional decision is Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701, 82 Stat. 197, 210-11, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3502 (1982)), passed in response to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). See Burt, supra note 11, at 118-34. More commonly, however, legislative proposals
hostile to the Court's constitutional decisions have failed to pass Congress. One recent ex-
ample is the Human Life Bill, discussed infra notes 163-77 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 11; infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
50. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (reaffirming
"the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution").
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dicta relegated to a footnote51-and the consequent danger that
Congress could use its fourteenth amendment enforcement power
to eviscerate substantive constitutional guarantees. As a result,
commentators have offered various theories concerning the con-
gressional power recognized in Morgan, positing internal and ex-
ternal limitations that restrain congressional power and preserve
the Court's basic role as expositor of the principles of constitu-
tional law.
A. The Factfinding Theory
One group of commentators, led by Professor Archibald Cox, 52
has attempted both to explain and to limit the reach of Morgan by
reference to Congress' superior factfinding attributes. According to
this "factfinding" theory, the Court in Morgan conferred no power
upon Congress to develop normative constitutional principles that
vary from those declared by the Court, but it did recognize Con-
gress' ability to apply Court-articulated principles to a greater
range of empirical situations than are available to the Court.53 This
theory is consistent with Justice Brennan's opinion in Mitchell. On
behalf of three members of the Court, Justice Brennan stated:
"The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate fo-
rum for the determination of complex factual questions. . . .Limi-
tations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, however,
have no application to Congress. 54 The theory articulated by Jus-
tice Brennan suggests that Congress can dispense with the pre-
sumption customarily entertained by courts that facts exist to sup-
port a state's justifications for legislative classifications. Instead,
according to the theory, Congress may investigate the factual basis
of such classifications independently to determine whether they
transgress Court-articulated fourteenth amendment standards.
In Mitchell, Justice Brennan also attempted to explain the
ratchet effect in terms of Congress' factfinding competence. Justice
51. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
52. See Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 11; Cox, Human Rights, supra
note 11.
53. See Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 11, at 199-200, 234; Cox, Human
Rights, supra note 11, at 108-09; Gordon, supra note 11.
54. 400 U.S. at 247-48 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ.).
[Vol. 27:331
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Brennan reasoned that, because a Court decision striking down a
state law indicates that no reasonably conceivable set of facts is
available to support it, Congress' "identical findings on the identi-
cal issue would be no more reasonable than those of the state legis-
lature. '55 This explanation is flawed, however, because the Court
no longer pays homage to the presumption of constitutionality in
reviewing "preferred rights" or "suspect classifications" but in-
stead routinely finds facts independently. 5 More fundamentally,
as some proponents of the factfinding theory concede, 57 any advan-
tage that Congress enjoys in investigating and appraising facts log-
ically cuts both ways. No apparent basis supports granting a lesser
degree of deference to a congressional judgment about empirical
conditions when a judgment serves to restrict the scope of consti-
tutional rights than when a judgment serves to expand the scope of
those rights.
Although the factfinding theory does not persuasively justify the
ratchet, and thus may cede to Congress a limited revisory power
over the Court's constitutional decisions, it does offer an apparent
means of reconciling the Court's interpretation of Congress' four-
teenth amendment enforcement power with concerns about Mar-
bury v. Madison and judicial supremacy. This reconciliation, how-
ever, is premised upon the Court's ability to distinguish between
Congress' "empirical" and "normative" judgments, and to defer
only to the former. Unfortunately, no reliable method is available
to discern whether a disagreement between Congress and the
Court is a disagreement in practice or a disagreement in principle.
In Mitchell, for example, Justice Brennan viewed as a factual de-
termination Congress' conclusion that the maturity of eighteen-
year-old citizens in today's society undermines any legitimate state
interest in denying them the vote.58 Justice Harlan, however,
viewed the same determination as "striking a balance between in-
commensurate interests" that "depends ultimately on the values
and the perspective of the decisionmaker. ' 59 A reconciliation of
55. See id. at 249 n.31 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
56. See L. TRIE, supra note 11, § 5-14, at 270-71.
57. See Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 11, at 254-56; Gordon, supra
note 11.
58. 400 U.S. at 240 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
59. Id. at 206 (opinion of Harlan, J.).
19861
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Morgan and Marbury that is based on such a nebulous distinction
is hardly satisfying. Characterization of a congressional action as
involving factual determinations rather than value judgments,
some commentators have suggested, simply may represent a policy
conclusion that the issue ought to be resolved politically rather
than judicially.60 Such a policy judgment, whether or not a real
threat to Marbury, ought to be aired candidly.
B. The Interest Balancing Theory
Other commentators have attempted to justify and limit Morgan
by invoking a different advantage that the political process enjoys
over the judicial process. These commentators point out that Con-
gress, unlike the Court, does not need to explain its decisions
through principles that transcend the particular problem ad-
dressed. Instead, these commentators note, Congress is free to bal-
ance competing interests through pragmatic compromises that do
not serve as precedents in other contexts.6 1 Congress can draw "ei-
ther rough or finely tuned distinctions, justified by practical con-
siderations . . . in a manner not generally thought open to a
court."62 Although Congress cannot supplant the Court as primary
expositor of core constitutional principles, according to these com-
mentators, it can assist the Court at the margins.6 3
Commentators advancing the interest balancing theory generally
would reject the ratchet footnote and would empower Congress to
revise the Court's constitutional decisions in both directions, albeit
within a relatively narrow peripheral zone. The interest balancing
theory thus reconciles the congressional power recognized in Mor-
gan with the judicial supremacy concerns thought to be embodied
in Marbury by relegating Congress to the role of "adjunct" to the
Court. In this way, the theory preserves the Court's ultimate role
of declaring core constitutional principles.
60. See Pilchen, supra note 11, at 396-98.
61. See Burt, supra note 11, at 112-14.
62. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. RE V. 1, 28-29 (1975).
63. This notion has been formulated in several ways. See Burt, supra note 11, at 112
(Congress can "devis[e an] appropriate adjustment of directly conflicting principles");
Monaghan, supra note 11 (Congress can modify the amalgam of provisional subrules and
corollaries that comprise "constitutional common law"); Sager, supra note 11 (Congress can
supplement the Court in advancing "underenforced" constitutional norms).
342 [Vol. 27:331
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The interest balancing theory has considerable intuitive appeal.
It evokes an image of Congress as a national forum for the prag-
matic adjustment of competing interests-an image that rings
truer than the image associated with the factfinding theory." The
theory also makes a strong case for the advantages of pragmatic
resolution of conflicting principles over a purely doctrinal resolu-
tion. The problem with the theory, however, is the difficulty in
confining Congress within the suggested limits. A vast array of the
Court's constitutional decisions adjust conflicting principles "at
the margins"; moreover, the distinction between core principles
and peripheral subrules is not always obvious. 5 As a result, the
theory threatens to subject much of the Court's constitutional
decisionmaking to congressional revision. This may be a desirable
goal, but it will require a weightier political justification than the
mere insight into the advantages of the political method over the
judicial method. The theoretical support for such an enhanced
congressional role in defining constitutional rights ultimately must
lie in the realm of political legitimacy rather than methodology
alone.6
C. The Statutory Rights Theory
A third set of commentators has launched a counterrevolution
against Morgan, challenging the suggestion that the enforcement
power of the fourteenth amendment grants Congress any power to
interpret the substantive meaning of the amendment or to revise
the Court's constitutional decisions. One commentator in this
group, for example, has suggested that
there is no basis for the assertion that Morgan grants to Con-
gress anything more than another fairly generous basis of
64. For a critique of the empirical assumptions associated with the factfinding theory,
which challenges both Congress' factfinding advantages over courts and Congress' objectiv-
ity, see Pilchen, supra note 11, at 362-77.
65. See L. TRIE, supra note 11, § 5-14, at 271. Compare, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104
S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984) (stating that the exclusionary rule is only a judicially-crafted rem-
edy) with id. at 3430-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that the exclusionary rule is an
integral part of the fourth amendment right).
66. Part IV of this Article sketches a position that builds on the view that courts should
exhibit special deference to congressional resolution of rights in conflict. See infra notes 77-
134 and accompanying text.
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legislative authority, analogous in breadth to the commerce
clause and other powers enumerated in article I. . . . [T]he de-
cision gives Congress no more authority over constitutional in-
terpretation, within the domain of equal protection and due pro-
cess, than it enjoys under article I grants such as the commerce
clause."7
These commentators suggest that any congressional action under
the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, even if purportedly
enacted as an "interpretation" of what due process or equal pro-
tection requires, really represents nothing more than a creation of
statutory rights that support the broad purposes and values of
Court-articulated constitutional rights. According to this view, con-
gressionally created rights may extend beyond Court-articulated
rights in a prophylactic "buffer" zone.
Proponents of the statutory rights theory disagree about the ap-
propriate internal limitations on Congress' fourteenth amendment
power. Some commentators cling tenaciously to the dichotomy be-
tween rights and remedies, arguing that the enforcement power al-
lows Congress only to implement the Court's constitutional man-
dates with remedial legislation."' This position, however, glosses
over important substantive implications associated with the con-
cept of remedies that make "rights" and "remedies" difficult to
distinguish. 9 Other commentators, such as Professor Tribe, 0 see
less importance in the internal limitations on Congress' fourteenth
amendment power. These commentators are content with the per-
missive rationality standard applied in Morgan, but they empha-
size the constraining role of external limitations such as the Bill of
Rights. In their view, the Court should apply the same standards
to legislation enacted under the fourteenth amendment enforce-
ment power as it applies to other congressional acts.71
67. Estreicher, supra note 11, at 421.
68. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 11, at 137.
69. The Court's opinion in Morgan is illustrative. In Morgan, the Court suggested that it
could sustain Congress' extension of the franchise as a "remedy" for a perceived possibility
of discrimination in the provision of public services. 384 U.S. at 652-53. Such tail-wagging
use of a power to create "remedies" has few apparent substantive limits.
70. See L. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 5-14, at 272.
71. See id.; Estreicher, supra note 11, at 371.
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This latter version of the "statutory rights" theory readily ex-
plains the ratchet. According to this theory, congressional expan-
sion of individual rights beyond the contours of the Court's consti-
tutional decisions merely represents an exercise of Congress'
plenary legislative authority, which may at times test internal limi-
tations and supplant the legislative role of the states, but does not
change the meaning of the Constitution. Congressional abridgment
or dilution of Court-articulated fourteenth amendment rights, on
the other hand, represents a violation of the fifth amendment due
process clause. 72 This explanation of the ratchet offers an emi-
nently plausible basis for reconciling the Morgan line of cases with
traditional concepts of judicial supremacy thought to be dictated
by Marbury v. Madison. As the next section points out, however,
this explanation is not without its weaknesses.
D. Conclusions About Existing Theories
All of these theories attempt to square the congressional power
recognized in Morgan with the precept of Marbury by attempting
to confine Congress' power in some fashion through either internal
or external limitations.73 The factflnding and interest balancing
theories sought to impose internal limitations by confining Con-
gress to applying the Court's principles to its view of the facts or to
adjusting the Court's principles "at the margins." Similarly, some
proponents of the statutory rights theory would limit Congress to
the creation of remedies for judicially-articulated rights.
Other proponents of the statutory rights theory, such as Profes-
sor Tribe, disavow any attempt to impose rigid internal limita-
tions. Their disavowal is based in part on the realization that con-
cerns about Marbury are fundamentally misplaced. According to
Professor Tribe:
72. The Court's approach in Morgan and Fullilove is consistent with this view. In both
cases, the Court considered not only whether the challenged congressional action was within
the internal limitations associated with the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, but
also whether the action abridged any individual rights that were protected by the fifth
amendment. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480-92, 503 n.4 (plurality opinion); Morgan, 384 U.S.
at 656-58; supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 52-54, 61-63, 67-68 & 70-71 and accompanying text.
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Marbury implies nothing about the criteria by which the Court
should determine whether an act of Congress is constitutional; it
requires only that such criteria should exist. Criteria which in-
validate all legislation founded on interpretations of the four-
teenth amendment different from those of the Supreme Court,
therefore, are no more consistent with Marbury than criteria
which allow Congress to adopt any plausible interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment. ... 74
Professor Tribe, however, fails to carry his insight over to the
question of external limitations on the enforcement power. In his
view, the Court must subject exercises of the enforcement power to
the same scrutiny under the Bill of Rights that it applies to legisla-
tion enacted under other congressional powers. 5 Professor Tribe
implies this requirement not from Marbury, but from the interest
in preserving the institution of judicial review. This interest, how-
ever, would seem to be purely prudential rather than constitution-
ally compelled. The Supreme Court may possess the power to test
exercises of the enforcement power for consistency with external
limitations under the same standards it applies to exercises of
other congressional powers. As Morgan demonstrates, however, the
Court need not always exercise its power. Instead, the Court can
choose to defer to Congress' interpretation of the Constitution.e
Such deference is particularly appropriate in the context of the
fourteenth amendment enforcement power, in light of the four-
teenth amendment's explicit invitation to an enhanced congres-
sional role in enforcing civil rights.
The leading cases also indicate that the Court on occasion has
relaxed the external limitations on the enforcement power. In Mor-
gan, for example, the Court reviewed Congress' distinction be-
tween persons educated in American-flag schools and persons edu-
cated in foreign-flag schools under a deferential "rational basis"
74. L. TamE, supra note 11, § 5-14, at 271-72.
75. Id. § 5-14, at 272.
76. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656 ("[It is enough that we perceive a basis upon which
Congress might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's English literacy
requirement to deny the right to vote ... constituted an invidious discrimination in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause."); see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
443 (1968) (deferring to congressional interpretation of the thirteenth amendment in en-
forcement legislation).
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test. In Fullilove, the Court reviewed an affirmative action plan
under what apparently was an intermediate level of scrutiny.
Seemingly, the Court ordinarily would review classifications of this
sort under a vigorous "strict scrutiny" standard. Although the
Court depicted its task in these cases as straightforward constitu-
tional interpretation, something more seems afoot. This Article
suggests that the Court's deference to Congress in these cases is
best explained as a recognition of Congress' legitimate, if not co-
equal, authority to interpret the fourteenth amendment, and a
prudential decision to defer to exercises of that authority.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF RIGHTS IN CONFLICT
A. Principles Directing Judicial Deference to Congressional
Determinations
Once the mystique of Marbury is cleared away, the task is to
determine what considerations should prompt the Court to exer-
cise self-restraint and defer to a congressional interpretation of the
Constitution. A wealth of legal and scholarly materials is available
to guide this task, once the inquiry is posed in this manner. Al-
though the Court has fashioned a number of general principles
that suggest the propriety of deference in particular situations, two
of these traditional principles pertain especially to the Court's con-
sideration of congressional actions under the fourteenth amend-
ment enforcement power. The satisfaction of one of these princi-
ples argues for deference in a particular case, and the convergence
of both principles makes an especially compelling case.
The first principle directs the Court to defer to Congress' resolu-
tion of issues when no clear or manageable judicial criteria are
available to guide judicial review of these actions-in other words,
when the Court has "no law to apply. 7 7 This principle is illus-
trated most vividly by the "political question" doctrine,78 which,
interestingly, was spawned by dicta in Marbury itself."' Although
the complete judicial abstention given to political questions makes
77. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
78. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
79. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 169-71.
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the doctrine appear jurisdictional in nature, one commentator has
pointed out that "[o]ften both the considerations underlying the
ruling that a question is political and the ruling's consequences for
the future course of the litigation seem indistinguishable from
those attendant upon judicial deference to legislative determina-
tions under the due process or equal protection clause."80 In such
situations, courts have no principled basis upon which to second-
guess the resolution of issues by the political process. The courts
ought to defer in such situations not merely because Congress is
better suited to make pragmatic policy decisions, but also because
Congress enjoys the legitimacy of a representative and accountable
political institution.8 1
The second principle directs the Court to defer to congressional
determinations that do not, on their face, seem to be the product
of majoritarian oppression of minorities. This principle stems from
the traditional notion that the Court's exercise of its constitutional
power to strike down legislation, which necessarily compromises
democratic values, is most justifiable when it operates to protect
the interests of politically vulnerable minorities.8 2 Non-minorities
ordinarily can protect their interests through the political safe-
guards of a democratic polity. In this conception, therefore, the
Court should use its power of judicial review to check the
majoritarian excesses potentially associated with a winner-take-all
political process, rather than to protect those political interests
that merely have lost a legislative battle. When a confrontation in
80. Cox, Constitutional Determinations, supra note 11, at 201.
81. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-
4 (1971).
82. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981); Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1985) (elaborating on the tradition of judicial protection for
"discrete and insular minorities" enunciated in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
In its most extreme and unabashedly sociological form, this minority rights notion sug-
gests that the Court should examine the actual patterns of political power that give rise to
legislation. Placing the justices into the role of political scientists, however, seems inconsis-
tent with another traditional principle of deference that instructs the Court not to look
behind the facial purposes of congressional enactments to inquire into the actual motives of
the legislators. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). Because of
this potential inconsistency, the minority rights notion best is applied only in the more gen-
eral sense of whether categories of cases entail a significant risk of majoritarian oppression
of minorities.
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Congress does not squarely pit the interests of a cohesive majority
against a vulnerable minority, the "political safeguards" principle
suggests that the Court should defer to the balance Congress
struck between the competing interests, thereby maintaining polit-
ical legitimacy and the integrity of institutions in a democratic
society.
B. Application of Principles to Particular Situations
These two principles are particularly helpful in explaining judi-
cial decisions that accord extreme deference to certain types of leg-
islative actions. For example, these principles offer perhaps the
best explanation of the modern Court's prudential decision to re-
frain from challenging Congress' impairment of federalism inter-
ests. Historically, the Court's efforts to enforce federalism-based
internal limitations on Congress' exercise of its express powers,
such as the commerce power, required the Court to employ rela-
tively amorphous and unmanageable standards involving artificial
distinctions between "local" and "national" functions. Somewhat
similarly, the Court's efforts to enforce external federalism-based
limits embroiled it in distinctions between "essential" and "non-
essential" attributes of state sovereignty.8 3 Application of these
standards not only was difficult at best, many commentators have
maintained, but also was largely unnecessary because the interests
of the states are more than adequately represented in Congress."
In many instances, then, deference to congressional actions adverse
to federalism interests arguably is supported by both the "no law
to apply" principle and the "political safeguards" principle. As a
result, considerations of sound judicial policy, properly respectful
of democratic values, arguably should direct the Court to defer to
Congress' accommodation of the states' interests.
83. Recently, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005
(1985), the Court stressed the amorphous nature of these standards as a justification for its
decision to overrule National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 1 (1976), in which the
Court had imposed relatively vigorous federalism constraints on congressional legislation
that sought to regulate the structure of state governments.
84. See Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensibility
of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Cohen, supra note 11, at 614, 620; Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
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The same analysis also can be applied in the context of individ-
ual rights. This Article suggests that when congressional legislation
reconciles a conflict between competing individual rights, the two
principles call for the same judicial deference to Congress that was
appropriate in the context of federalism issues. The explosion of
individual rights in recent decades, resulting from expansive con-
struction of explicit rights and liberal implication of non-textual
rights, inevitably has led to situations in which these rights butt
heads. The Court is faced with the embarassing task of reconciling
these overlapping and conflicting claims of rights: the due process
rights of criminal defendants to fair trials against the first amend-
ment rights of the press to report about trials;85 the property rights
of shopping mall owners to exclude unwanted guests against the
first amendment rights of individuals to demonstrate in "public fo-
rums"; 86 the free exercise rights of members of religious groups to
exemption from burdensome laws against the establishment clause
rights of individuals seeking to preserve government neutrality to-
ward religion.8
Although the Court regularly decides such cases, and no doubt
should continue to do so, its reconciliation of these conflicts should
be regarded as provisional, subject to some congressional revision
under its fourteenth amendment enforcement power. Cases of
competing rights arguably satisfy both principles of deference.
First, the Court has "no law to apply" when resolving such con-
flicts. Although each claimant asserts a right supported by an inde-
pendent constitutional principle, no overriding principles are avail-
able to order these putative rights into a constitutional hierarchy.8
The Court must resolve such cases to prevent the government from
being whipsawed by inconsistent claims. Such resolutions, how-
ever, must rest largely on grounds of expediency rather than prin-
ciple, and should not be binding on Congress. These frankly prag-
matic or policy-oriented choices between competing rights are
85. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
86. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
87. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
88. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982) ("[W]e know of no principled basis on which to create a
hierarchy of constitutional values.").
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made most legitimately by a broadly representative and responsive
political institution like Congress.
Second, adequate "political safeguards" are present in cases in-
volving rights in conflict. In such cases, the risk of a coherent ma-
jority oppressing a politically vulnerable minority is insubstantial.
When Congress resolves these conflicts, persons claiming the sub-
ordinated right remain constitutionally protected, in other con-
texts, from the majority. Congress simply has decided, in a single
context, which "politically vulnerable" interest must give way to
the other or what compromise should be struck between them.
Congress' accommodation of competing constitutional rights,
therefore, is analogous to the traditional legislative task of mediat-
ing conflicts between opposing private interests. These situations
ordinarily do not involve a square conflict between a coherent,
identifiable majority and a vulnerable minority. They simply in-
volve a battle between opposing pressure groups and a legislative
choice between them-the essence of democracy. 9 The choice may
reflect the legislators' conscientious view of what the public inter-
est requires, or it simply may respond to the relative political
power of the competing interests. Such decisions, however, are the
standard fare of legislation in a democratic polity. The mere exis-
tence of the fourteenth amendment enforcement power suggests
that the framers of the amendment did not regard Congress as pre-
cluded from addressing such conflicts when they arose at a consti-
tutional level.
C. The Rights in Conflict Theory
1. Outline of the Theory
The rights in conflict theory would hold that the enforcement
section of the fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to strike
a balance between competing constitutional claims, subject to lim-
ited judicial review. Because the scope of this authority should not
depend on whether Congress or the Court addresses an issue
first,90 Congress should be free to revise the Court's prior
89. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (legislative decision to destroy cedar
tress because they harmed nearby apple trees was not an unconstitutional "taking").
90. See Burt, supra note 11, at 122-23.
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resolution of such cases when it disagrees with the balance struck
by the Court. Under this theory, Congress would not be entirely
unconstrained because the Court still could review congressional
accommodations for consistency with the internal and external
limitations of the fourteenth amendment enforcement power, al-
beit under relatively relaxed and deferential standards."'
2. Consistency with Court Pronouncements
The rights in conflict theory resembles the approach that Justice
White suggested in his dissenting opinion in Welsh v. United
States,9 2 decided in 1970. In Welsh, the Court considered whether
a statutory draft exemption for conscientious objectors that was
limited to "religious" beliefs, as opposed to purely philosophical
beliefs, violated the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Basing its holding solely on the statute, a majority of the Court
held that purely moral or ethical beliefs were included under the
exemption. 3 Justice White, however, read the statute as limited to
religious beliefs, and therefore would have reached the constitu-
tional issue. Justice White maintained that an exemption limited
to religious beliefs did not run afoul of the establishment clause.
He reasoned that Congress could have created such an exemption
simply to avoid violating the free exercise rights of members of re-
ligious groups, and thus could have limited the exemption to indi-
viduals with free-exercise-based objections to the draft.9 4 Justice
White conceded that the Court, free of any congressional pro-
nouncements, probably would deny a free exercise challenge by re-
ligious objectors to the draft. 5 He noted, however, that "this Court
is not alone in being obliged to construe the Constitution in the
course of its work; nor does it even approach having a monopoly on
the wisdom and insight appropriate to the task."96 Citing Morgan,
91. For example, the Court could decide whether Congress, in interpreting competing
rights and resolving a conflict by advancing a particular right, acted according to a "ra-
tional" interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51; supra
notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
92. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
93. Id. at 343-44.
94. Id. at 367-73 (White, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
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Justice White stated that he would have deferred to Congress' "ar-
guable" constitutional interpretation and, implicitly, to the balance
that Congress had struck between the free exercise and establish-
ment claims at issue.9 7
Justice White's analysis applies at least with equal force to Con-
gress' accommodation of rights in conflict under its fourteenth
amendment enforcement power. In fact, it may apply with even
greater force. The congressional power to raise armies involved in
Welsh 8 does not imply authority to interpret the Constitution in
the same way the fourteenth amendment enforcement power does.
The power to enforce the fourteenth amendment is a power to en-
force, and by implication to interpret, important constitutional
guarantees such as due process and equal protection.9 The power
to raise armies, on the other hand, is not the sort of textual basis
from which one reasonably may imply congressional authority to
interpret the Constitution.'" The deference that Justice White
suggested for congressional constitutional interpretations, there-
fore, seems even more appropriate in the context of the fourteenth
amendment enforcement power than it did in the context of
Welsh.
The rights in conflict theory also is consistent with the concept
of the ratchet as an internal limitation on Congress' fourteenth
amendment power. A congressional enactment adjusting rights in
conflict necessarily expands one of the rights in question, albeit at
the expense of the other right. This type of rights balancing is a
wholly different matter than cutting down a constitutional right
simply to advance the regulatory interests of a majority. If the
ratchet footnote is read as embracing external limitations as
97. See id. at 370-72 (White, J., dissenting).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
99. See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. The statute challenged in Welsh did implicate first amendment issues such as free
exercise and free speech. See 398 U.S. at 367-74 (White, J., dissenting). These implications
were collateral to the enactment, however, because Congress passed the statute challenged
in Welsh mainly to establish a draft and not to interpret the first amendment. See 50
U.S.C.A. app. §§ 451-473 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985) (Military Selective Service Act); see
also Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336-39 (outlining constitutional challenge to § 6(j) of the Military
Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(0) (1964)). If Congress passed legislation under
its fourteenth amendment enforcement power, on the other hand, it by definition would
have to focus on the proper interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
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well, 1 1 one could argue that Congress never could dilute Court-
articulated rights, even in the course of expanding others. That ar-
gument, however, merely asserts in another way that Congress
lacks power to enforce an interpretation of the Constitution differ-
ent from that of the Court. Morgan and its progeny do not support
this assertion. 1 2 Enactments under the enforcement power that
seek to dilute Court-articulated external limitations may raise pru-
dential concerns about whether these enactments unduly supplant
the Supreme Court's unique constitutional role. Regardless of
whether these concerns are met adequately by the two principles
of deference, however, the ratchet footnote does not settle the
question.
Although the relevant precedent does not compel the rights in
conflict theory, it does support it. In Morgan, for example, the
Court reviewed Congress' fidelity to external limitations under a
deferential "rational basis" standard. The plaintiffs claimed that
Congress had violated the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment when it suspended English literacy tests for prospec-
tive voters educated in Puerto Rican schools but not for voters ed-
ucated in foreign schools. The Court disagreed, maintaining that
extending the franchise was a "reform" measure that the Court
would not invalidate merely because it was underinclusive. 103 The
Court's reliance on cases dealing with economic or regulatory legis-
lation'04 was misplaced, however, because the Court traditionally
has reviewed distinctions drawn along lines of ethnic or national
origin, like those involved in Morgan, under the more rigorous
"strict scrutiny" test.10 5 In addition, Morgan involved a congres-
sional enactment that enhanced the political power of Puerto Ri-
cans, but that arguably diluted the political power of foreign-
educated minorities. If such a classification had resulted not from a
congressional enactment under the fourteenth amendment enforce-
ment power, but from a state enactment, the Court might have
101. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
103. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-51 nn.7-8; see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
104. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (cited in Morgan, 384 U.S.
at 657).
105. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to strike
down ban on miscegenation).
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focused on this dilution to strike down the enactment. The Court's
deferential review in Morgan, then, seems best explained by Con-
gress' special constitutional competence to balance rights in
conflict.
The Court's review of affirmative action programs in Fullilove v.
Klutznick10 6 and Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke10 7 provides a further demonstration of the Court's tendency
to relax external limitations on Congress' fourteenth amendment
enforcement actions when accommodation of conflicting rights is
involved. The Court in both cases produced a multiplicity of sepa-
rate and inconsistent opinions, making the extraction of firm prin-
ciples transcending a simple "head-count" of the Justices diffi-
cult.108 In general, the opinions of Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun demonstrate a willingness to uphold af-
firmative action programs whether instituted by Congress or an-
other institution, 09 while the opinions of Justices Stevens, Stew-
art, and Rehnquist demonstrate the opposite conclusion.110 The
swing votes belonged to Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger,
who noted distinctions between the cases that resulted in the
Court's overall decisions to uphold the congressionally-imposed af-
firmative action program in Fullilove and to strike down the use of
racial quotas in a state medical school's affirmative action program
in Bakke.""
106. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
107. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
108. When the Court recently revisited the affirmative action issue, it produced five sepa-
rate opinions, none of which commanded a majority. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
54 U.S.L.W. 4479 (U.S. May 19, 1986) (striking down affirmative action provision in state
schoolteachers' contract).
109. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan and
Blackmun, JJ.); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Black-
mun, JJ.). Justice White joined Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion in Fullilove, which,
like Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, upheld the challenged affirmative action pro-
gram. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 449 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell,
JJ.).
110. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.); id. at
532 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Bur-
ger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
111. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 449 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell,
JJ.); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 408 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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Justice Powell noted a clear constitutional distinction between
the two cases. He maintained that racial distinctions were justifia-
ble on the facts of Fullilove, but not on the facts of Bakke, because
in Fullilove an appropriate political institution had made findings
outlining past unlawful discrimination against racial minorities.
These findings, according to Justice Powell, served to support pref-
erential treatment as a remedy.112 Congress was an appropriate
body to make such findings precisely because of the fourteenth
amendment enforcement clause." 3 Justice Powell concluded his
concurring opinion in Fullilove by noting:
[R]acial classifications ... are fundamentally at odds with the
ideals of a democratic society implicit in the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses .... But the issue here turns on the
scope of congressional power, and Congress has been given a
unique constitutional role in the enforcement of the post-Civil
War Amendments." 4
Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, believed that Congress
had imposed color-blindness in Bakke but that it had authorized
racial preferences in Fullilove. He regarded the congressional pro-
gram in Fullilove as a reasonable exercise of the fourteenth
amendment enforcement power aimed at eradicating the effects of
past discrimination." 5 Equating Fullilove with Morgan, Mitch-
ell,1 6 and City of Rome v. United States,"7 Chief Justice Burger
maintained that "congressional authority extends beyond the pro-
hibition of purposeful discrimination to encompass state action
that has discriminatory impact."""' Although the Chief Justice ex-
amined whether the congressional means were "well-tailored" and
thus consistent with external limitations based on the equal pro-
tection guarantee, he repeatedly emphasized the importance of de-
ferring to congressional resolution of such conflicts. 1 9 He closed
his opinion by quoting Justice Jackson:
112. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 498-99, 502-06 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. See id. at 499-502 (Powell, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 516 (Powell, J., concurring).
115. See id. at 491-92 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
116. 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (cited in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477).
117. 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (cited in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477).
118. 448 U.S. at 477 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
119. See, e.g., id. at 490 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
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The Supreme Court can maintain itself and succeed only if the
counsels of self-restraint. . . are humbly and faithfully heeded.
After the forces of conservatism and liberalism, of radicalism
and reaction, of emotion and of self-interest are all caught up in
the legislative process and averaged and come to rest in some
compromise measure such as the Missouri Compromise, the
N.R.A., the A.A.A., a minimum-wage law, or some other legisla-
tive policy, a decision striking it down closes an area of compro-
mise .... The vice of judicial supremacy ... has been its pro-
gressive closing of the avenues to peaceful and democratic
conciliation of our social and economic conflicts. 120
Both Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger in these cases
seemed to stress the importance of Court deference to the reasona-
ble resolution of competing constitutional claims by an accounta-
ble national forum, regardless of whether the Court would strike
the same balance between the claims.121 Although one could read
Chief Justice Burger or Justice Powell's opinions as suggesting def-
erence only to congressional determinations of "facts" rather-than
"law," this reading would not capture the spirit of their opinions.
These precedents do not compel acceptance of the rights in con-
flict theory. They do, however, at least authorize it. The rights in
conflicts theory, therefore, should be examined on its own merits.
3. Potential Objections to the Theory
The rights in conflict theory may prompt several objections.
Some have suggested, for example, that congressional protection of
"rights" and congressional advancement of regulatory interests
cannot be distinguished sufficiently. 122 Because the Court would
have no reason to defer to congressional enactments that diluted
Court-articulated rights simply to advance the majority's interests,
these critics argue, the Court similarly should not defer to such
enactments when they are cloaked in the form of "rights.' 23
120. Id. at 490-91 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.) (quoting R.
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SuPREMAcY 321 (1941)).
121. See supra notes 112-13 & 119 and accompanying text.
122. See Estreicher, supra note 11, at 428 n.318; Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Consti-
tutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1022, 1031-32 (1978).
123. For example, if Congress passed a law banning demonstrations in public parks, to
secure the public interest in peaceful parks, the Court would not acquiesce in Congress'
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Although the task sometimes may be difficult, however, an attempt
to distinguish rights from regulatory interests would be worthwhile
in light of our jurisprudential and constitutional heritage that
uniquely recognizes the importance of individual rights that tran-
scend the broad interests of diffuse majorities.124
The principles spelled out earlier in this Article that determine
when deference is appropriate125 also explain why deference is
more important when rights in conflict are involved than it is when
the rights of citizens against the government are involved, and
therefore why a distinction between the two situations is impor-
tant. The "no law to apply" principle supports greater deference
when the Court considers the accommodation of competing rights
because no clear manageable criteria exist to prioritize those rights
in particular situations. Although judges must exercise sensitive
judgment when deciding whether the interests of the majority out-
weigh asserted individual rights, the resolution of rights in conflict
requires not only a similar balancing analysis with respect to each
right, but also a subsequent balancing analysis weighing the out-
come for each right against the other. The whole process resembles
a type of general equilibrium analysis, without determinate stan-
dards to guide the Court.
The "political safeguards" principle suggests a similar conclusion
because congressional adjustment of rights in conflict does not en-
tail the same risks of majoritarian oppression involved in congres-
sional balancing of individual rights against governmental inter-
ests. If the Court deferred to a congressional determination that a
particular individual right should be subordinated to governmental
policy objectives, it in essence would be allowing Congress to be
the judge of its own cause.226 If the Court deferred to a
judgment that such a law is constitutional. Similarly, according to the argument, the Court
should not defer to such a law if Congress passed it under the enforcement power, phrasing
it in terms of securing individuals' constitutional rights to peaceful parks. Under the rights
in conflict theory, however, the Court still could invalidate such a measure if it concluded
that the "right to peaceful parks" was not of colorable constitutional vintage.
124. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); supra notes 85-87 and accompa-
nying text.
125. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text ("no law to apply" principle); supra
note 82 and accompanying text ("political safeguards" principle).
126. This insight may constitute the best explanation of the ratchet footnote. See Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10; supra note 8 and accompanying text. Because Congress, in
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congressional accommodation of rights in conflict, on the other
hand, it simply would be permitting Congress to decide conscien-
tiously which right better deserves protection against the majority.
Another potential objection to the theory is the idea that in
"'hard cases' . . . the politically independent status of the judici-
ary is most welcome.1127 Even if one concedes that the federal judi-
ciary is more familiar with constitutional rights than Congress is,
rendering the judiciary more competent to order competing rights
in a constitutionally "correct" manner,128 the criteria employed to
accommodate such conflicts typically will not be constitutionally
compelled and will relate more to concerns of expediency than of
principle. Because the Court cannot offer a clear constitutional an-
swer to these conflicts, the course arguably required by concerns of
political legitimacy is to seek not a "politically independent" deci-
sionmaker, but a politically responsive one like Congress.
Finally, critics of the rights in conflict theory might argue that
Congress could abuse its authority by using it to overturn constitu-
tional decisions to which it is hostile. To use the frequently cited
example suggested by the ratchet footnote, Congress could purport
to subordinate the equal protection rights of minority schoolchil-
dren to the free association rights of white schoolchildren to justify
balancing individual rights against governmental interests, would be acting against the ma-
jority's interests by deciding to expand individual rights, the Court need not scrutinize these
actions closely. On the other hand, Congress' incentive to dilute individual rights to achieve
what it views as important governmental objectives suggests the need to scrutinize those
decisions carefully.
127. L. TRmE, supra note 11, § 5-14, at 271 n.50. Justice Powell's statement in Fullilove
that "[d]istinguishing the rights of all citizens to be free from racial classifications from the
rights of some citizens to be made whole is a perplexing, but necessary, judicial task," 448
U.S. at 516, might be read as support for this notion. Taken as a whole, however, Justice
Powell's concurring opinion clearly maintains that the Court should give Congress leeway to
address the issue of affirmative action, despite the Court's indications of disapproval in
Bakke. See, e.g., id. at 515 ("When Congress acts to remedy identified discrimination, it
may exercise discretion in choosing a remedy that is reasonably necessary to accomplish its
purpose."); id. at 516-17 ('In this case, where Congress determined that minority contrac-
tors were victims of purposeful discrimination and where Congress chose a reasonably neces-
sary means to effectuate its purpose, I find no constitutional reason to invalidate [Congress'
action].").
128. This contention is by no means unassailable. Some of the Court's most eminent
members have questioned its validity. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring in the result) ("We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final.").
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a reversal of Brown v. Board of Education'2" under its fourteenth
amendment enforcement power.130 At best, such examples re-
present "slippery slope" logic. Even assuming that such a threat is
plausible, the rights in conflict theory provides a check against
such abuses by allowing the Court to retain ultimate authority to
review congressional judgments for rationality.""' If the Court con-
sidered the hypothetical congressional attack on Brown, for exam-
ple, it could find that the measure did not represent a rational in-
terpretation of the free association right standing alone, 3 2 much
less a defensible accommodation of free association and equal pro-
tection rights.
Beyond the context of such hypothetical slippery slope cases,
congressional participation in the process of defining fundamental
rights plainly is desirable. Today, the Court decides on constitu-
tional grounds most of the important public policy controversies in
the Republic, often resolving conflicts among rights that the Court
either expressly or impliedly has recognized in prior decisions. This
expansive constitutional jurisdiction threatens to supplant the
processes of self-government spelled out in the constitutional plan.
A congressional role in resolving conflicts among competing rights
would make the constitutional lawmaking process more responsive
and flexible, assuaging the so-called "countermajoritarian diffi-
culty" of judicial review. 33 By allowing Congress to enter the con-
stitutional lawmaking process through the exercise of its four-
teenth amendment enforcement power, a "dialogue" would open
between Congress and the Court that would compel a continuous
reevaluation of the frontiers of constitutional doctrine.134
129. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
130. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10; see Emerson, supra note 11, at 142.
131. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
132. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973) ("Invidious private discrimina-
tion may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.").
Even if Congress rationally could interpret constitutional rights of association to encompass
private discrimination, Congress in the public school context could not advance the associa-
tional rights of some white schoolchildren through segregation without impairing the associ-
ational rights of other schoolchildren, white and black, who opposed segregation.
133. A. BicaniL, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANCH 16-23 (1962).
134. See Gunther, Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions: Distinguishing
Constitutionality and Wisdom, 18 STAN. LAW. 24, 25 (1983) (noting the salutory function of
"permit[ting] political tensions to be aired" by measures short of constitutional
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V. Two APPLICATIONS OF THE RIGHTS IN CONFLICT THEORY
The rights in conflict theory illuminates some of the difficult is-
sues raised in current controversies before Congress and the courts.
The dramatic expansion of the Supreme Court's constitutional
decision-making in recent decades has given rise to a variety of
situations in which putative constitutional claims and interests
have conflicted. 13 5 The Court in effect has established a general su-
pervisory authority over the states' regulation of primary conduct
and relationships under their common law and police powers.
Quite naturally, Congress increasingly has responded by asserting
its interest in addressing these fundamental conflicts between con-
stitutional rights of free expression, free association, freedom from
discrimination, and the like.136 The rights in conflict theory offers a
convincing basis both for justifying these congressional responses
and for suggesting the appropriate limitations on Congress'
authority.
A. The Equal Access Act
The broad construction that the Court has accorded to both the
free exercise clause 137 and the establishment clause 3 ' of the first
amendment has led to an apparent tension between the two consti-
tutional guarantees.139 In Widmar v. Vincent,140 decided in 1981,
the Court grappled with this tension. In Widmar, a public univer-
sity had denied student religious groups the use of school facilities,
claiming that the exclusion was necessary to avoid a violation of
amendment); cf. A. BicKEL, supra note 133, at 143-69 (noting the interplay between legisla-
tive and judicial forces).
135. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (holding that state
statute banning sex discrimination in private clubs did not violate club members' free asso-
ciation rights); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that denial of
tax exemption to school practicing religiously-motivated racial discrimination did not vio-
late school's free exercise rights); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that
congressional statute banning private schools' racially discriminatory practices did not vio-
late privacy rights, free association rights, or the rights of parents to direct their children's
educations).
136. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 4071-4074 (West Supp. 1985) (Equal Access Act).
137. U.S. CONsT. amend. I, cl. 2.
138. Id. amend. I, cl. 1.
139. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 416 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
140. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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the establishment clause.141 The Court, without reaching the free
exercise issue, held that the university's exclusionary policy vio-
lated the groups' free speech rights. 42 Because the university had
created a "forum" generally available to voluntary student groups,
the Court maintained, the university could not deny one group ac-
cess to that forum based on the content of the group's speech, ab-
sent a compelling interest.143 The Court conceded that avoidance
of a establishment clause violation could, in principle, amount to a
compelling interest. 44 On the facts of Widmar, however, the Court
found no potential violation of the establishment clause. 45 The
Court reasoned that, because a university policy allowing all volun-
tary student groups to use school facilities would not imply an en-
dorsement of these groups' activities, a grant of equal access to re-
ligious groups would not compromise the neutrality toward religion
mandated by the establishment clause. 46 The Court in Widmar
thus avoided a conflict with the establishment clause by restricting
the reach of that clause essentially on an ad hoc basis.
Congress subsequently passed the Equal Access Act, 47 which ex-
tended to secondary school religious groups the protections that
the Court had afforded to university level groups in Widmar. The
Act forbids public secondary schools that receive federal funds
from denying student groups access to any extracurricular "open
forum" based on the content of the groups' speech. 48 Congress'
purpose was "to clarify and confirm the First Amendment rights of
freedom of speech, freedom of association, and free exercise of
141. Id. at 265, 270.
142. Id. at 277.
143. Id. at 267-70.
144. Id. at 271.
145. Id. at 271-75.
146. More specifically, the Court held that an equal access policy would pass the three-
pronged test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (cited in Widmar, 454
U.S. at 271). According to the Court, an equal access policy would have a secular purpose,
its primary effect would neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it would not entail "exces-
sive entanglement" of government and religion. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-75.
147. The Equal Access Act was passed as title VIII of the Education for Economic Secur-
ity Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, §§ 801-805, 98 Stat. 1267, 1302-04 (1984) (codified at 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 4071-4074 (West Supp. 1985)).
148. Id. § 802(a), 98 Stat. at 1302 (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(a) (West Supp. 1985)).
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religion which accrue to public school students. ' 149 Congress spe-
cifically determined that the treatment of voluntary, student-initi-
ated religious activities in the same manner as other extracurricu-
lar activities would not create establishment clause problems.
According to the legislative history, Congress found no establish-
ment clause problems because it found that high school students
were sufficiently mature to realize that a school did not sponsor or
endorse religion merely by providing access to school facilities.150
In the absence of the Equal Access Act, some lower courts had
refused to extend the reasoning in Widmar to the secondary school
context. In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District,'5' de-
cided before Congress passed the Equal Access Act, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a free
speech challenge brought by a religious student group that had
been denied the opportunity to participate in an extracurricular
activities period. The Third Circuit maintained that religious ac-
tivities on high school property might create an appearance of
school sponsorship or endorsement. The court distinguished
Widmar based on perceived differences between the high school
and university environments. 152 The court concluded that, al-
though the school's exclusionary policy implicated free speech con-
cerns, an equal access policy would violate the establishment
clause.153
The Third Circuit thus explicitly recognized the conflicting con-
stitutional claims present in Bender. According to the court, the
case involved a "constitutional conflict of the highest order" be-
tween the free speech and establishment clauses,"" for which the
framers of the Constitution must have intended "some sort of com-
promise and accommodation."' 55 The court frankly stated: "Recog-
nizing that, under these circumstances, some constitutional
protections must unavoidably be abridged, we believe that our role
149. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 US. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2348, 2349.
150. See id. at 8-10, 35, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS at 2354-56, 2381.
151. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on standing grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).
152. See id. at 556.
153. See id. at 559-60.
154. Id. at 557.
155. Id. at 558.
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is to maximize, as best as possible, the overall measure of the fun-
damental rights created by the Framers. . . ."I" In this context,
the Third Circuit struck the balance in favor of the establishment
clause.
The Third Circuit's opinion in Bender offers a uniquely candid
discussion of the problems that courts face when they attempt to
reconcile rights in conflict. Often, courts have accommodated such
conflicts simply by holding that one right or another did not ex-
tend to the context under review.157 Although the Supreme Court
did not reach the merits of the constitutional issues in Bender,158 it
may follow this pattern if it ultimately addresses the same issue in
another case. The Court may resolve the conflict, as it resolved
Widmar, by holding that an equal access policy would not violate
the establishment clause. Such a holding would remove the doubts
about the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act that the Third
Circuit created in Bender.159
Under the rights in conflict theory, however, even a Supreme
Court decision holding that an equal access policy would be uncon-
stitutional in the secondary school context would not necessarily
invalidate the Equal Access Act. No matter how the Court inde-
pendently balances free speech and establishment rights, according
to the theory, the Act represents Congress' accommodation of
those rights under its fourteenth amendment enforcement power,
which should stand as long as it survives a review for rationality.
The Equal Access Act very arguably meets that standard.
The Equal Access Act seems to accord with the internal limita-
tions on the fourteenth amendment power. Congress passed the
Act to secure more fully the free speech guarantees recognized by
the Court in Widmar. Extension of the equal access right to
156. Id. at 559.
157. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-75; supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
The Solicitor General of the United States, in fact, took such a position in the amicus brief
he submitted to the Supreme Court in Bender. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 10-12, Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986). According to the
Solicitor General, the Third Circuit's holding in Bender that the case implicated the estab-
lishment clause was erroneous. Id. Interestingly, however, the Solicitor General also main-
tained that, even if free speech and establishment rights did conflict in the case, Congress
and not the courts should settle the conflict. Id. at 12-13.
158. The Supreme Court reversed Bender on standing grounds. 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).
159. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 157, at 1-3.
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secondary school groups plainly is "rational" in light of the Court's
previous recognition that free speech rights exist in such
settings. 16 0
The Act also is consistent with the external limitations on the
enforcement power, when measured by the relaxed, deferential
scrutiny appropriate for exercises of that power. According to the
rights in conflict theory, the fourteenth amendment enforcement
power authorizes Congress to accommodate these conflicting rights
by assigning priority to free speech and free exercise interests over
establishment clause concerns. In passing the Act, Congress appar-
ently concluded that the potential appearance of state hostility to
religion associated with an exclusionary policy, and the consequent
harm to free speech and free exercise values, poses a greater risk
than the potential appearance of state sponsorship of religion asso-
ciated with an equal access policy. This conclusion is within the
zone of reasonable interpretation contemplated under a rationality
review.161
The Equal Access Act represents a reasonable accommodation of
rights in conflict by the Nation's most broadly representative and
accountable institution. Because, as the Supreme Court has recog-
nized in another context, the Court has "no principled basis on
which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values, '162 the Court
should respect Congress' choice in the Equal Access Act between
competing constitutional values. Under the rights in conflict the-
ory, the Court would do just that.
B. The Human Life Bill
One of the most heated political controversies of our day is the
conflict between the "right to life" and the "right to choose" that
160. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
161. The Act's consistency with external limitations also could be explained under the
factfinding theory. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. This theory would focus
on Congress' determination that high school students are sufficiently mature to appreciate
that an equal access policy does not indicate the sort of state approval of religion banned by
the establishment clause. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. According to the the-
ory, Congress' finding should receive judicial deference.
162. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982).
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is embodied in the debate concerning abortion. The Human Life
Bill' 63 was a congressional attempt to resolve the conflict by over-
ruling Roe v. Wade16 1 through a declaration that fetuses were "per-
sons" protected by the fourteenth amendment. Critics assailed this
proposed legislation as "a serious challenge to the structure of our
constitutional system"'165 and "a bold attempt by some members of
Congress to usurp the function of the judiciary."' 6 In spite of
these criticisms, however, the Human Life Bill presents a close
case under the rights in conflict theory. Ultimately, however, the
Bill probably is beyond the outer boundaries of Congress' four-
teenth amendment enforcement power.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment
due process clause does not protect the unborn against the depri-
vation of life, liberty, or property because fetuses are not "persons"
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.16 7 The Court ex-
pressly refused to decide when human life begins, explaining:
"When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, phi-
losophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is
not in a position to speculate as to the answer. '168
Proponents of the Human Life Bill have seized on the Court's
expression of judicial abstention to argue that Roe v. Wade rested
primarily on the Court's institutional self-restraint. These propo-
nents contend that Congress, on the other hand, is free to use its
superior "factfinding" abilities to decide that life begins at concep-
tion and to broaden the scope of the fourteenth amendment
accordingly. 6 9 A congressional action expanding the reach of the
due process clause to include fetuses despite the Court's contrary
holding, these proponents argue, should stand on no different foot-
ing than a congressional action to expand the equal protection
163. The Human Life Bill has not been reintroduced in the current Congress, and appar-
ently is dormant. The most recent version of the bill was S. 26, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REc. S225 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983).
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. Emerson, supra note 11, at 130.
166. Kolb, The Proposed Human Life Statute: Abortion as Murder?, 67 A.BA J. 1123,
1126 (1981).
167. 410 U.S. at 157-58.
168. Id. at 159.
169. See Galebach, supra note 11, at 6-10.
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clause to protect certain voters from English literacy requirements
despite the Court's previous refusal to recognize such broad
protection. 170
In retrospect, the Court's reliance on concepts such as "viabil-
ity," which are subject to technological change, gave its opinion in
Roe v. Wade a contingent nature that invited responses such as the
Human Life Bill. Proponents of the bill have attempted to refute
the Court's assertions concerning viability by proffering new medi-
cal evidence suggesting that fetuses should be regarded as human
beings.1 1 Although this evidence is relevant to whether fetuses can
be regarded as human beings, the question left open in Roe v.
Wade obviously implicates vexing moral issues that cannot be re-
duced to any mechanical exercise of congressional "factfinding.M72
In addition, even a finding that fetuses should be regarded as
human beings does not necessarily support the conclusion that
they are "persons" protected by the fourteenth amendment. Ulti-
mately, however, if corporations are "persons" entitled to the pro-
tections of the fourteenth amendment, 173 an argument that Con-
gress could not rationally interpret the amendment to include
fetuses as well seems difficult to support.
The inclusion of fetuses within the reach of the fourteenth
amendment would have profound consequences. It could affect a
wide range of issues in the criminal law and the law of torts, trusts,
inheritance, and other areas.17 4 Contrary to the assumption of the
bill's proponents, however, it would not automatically overturn the
Court's further holding in Roe v. Wade that women have a consti-
tutional right to terminate their pregnancies. 75 That holding
170. See Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on the
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1981)
(testimony of Dr. Hymie Gordon); The Silent Scream, film produced by Dr. Bernard Na-
thanson, shown on Nightline, ABC Television (Feb. 12, 1985).
172. The Court's holding in Mitchell that Congress could not extend the right to vote to
eighteen-year-old citizens, see 400 U.S. 112 (1970), also might be invoked as authority to
prohibit an apparently analogous extension of fourteenth amendment rights to the unborn.
The result in Mitchell, however, is explained more accurately as an expression of external
rather than internal limitations. See infra note 178.
173. See, e.g., Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897).
174. See Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality
of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 257 (1982).
175. See 410 U.S. at 154.
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would be affected differently than the holding concerning the con-
stitutional status of fetuses because it involves external rather than
internal limitations. Quite simply, the internal limitations on Con-
gress' power to extend fourteenth amendment protections to fe-
tuses are analytically distinct from the external limitations on
Congress' ability to override other Court-articulated rights, such as
the right to privacy.
Because the Human Life Bill, at least on its face, represents a
congressional accommodation of conflicting constitutional rights,
deferential standards arguably should apply both to internal limi-
tations and external limitations. Even under these deferential stan-
dards, however, the Human Life Bill stands on a different footing
than accommodations involving true conflicts between constitu-
tional rights. The Court framed the issue in Roe v. Wade not as a
conflict between competing rights, but as a conflict between
women's privacy rights and states' interests in protecting maternal
health and potential life. 17 6 The legal context in which such dis-
putes find their way to Congress is crucial to the extent of Con-
gress' revisory power. The Court's holding that fetuses are not
"persons" protected by the fourteenth amendment, therefore, nec-
essarily circumscribes congressional action in this area. To uphold
the Human Life Bill, the Court would have to defer both to Con-
gress' judgment that fetuses are "persons" protected by the four-
teenth amendment and to Congress' judgment that fetuses' rights
to life take constitutional priority over women's rights to privacy.
Such deference clearly would represent a dramatic delegation to
Congress of the Court's constitutional authority. Consequently, the
Court probably would not uphold an enactment such as the
Human Life Bill as a rational interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment. In light of the parameters set by the Court in Roe v.
Wade, the Human Life Bill simply would go too far. To allow Con-
gress simultaneously to create a new species of constitutional
rights and to balance those rights against Court-articulated rights
would be to cede revisory authority without apparent limit. If the
Court allowed Congress to do so, Congress often would be able to
176. See id. at 152-62.
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translate its regulatory interests into individual rights." The intu-
ition embodied in the ratchet footnote, as well as prudential con-
cerns about the institution of judicial review, counsel against the
concession of such power to Congress.
This analysis suggests that, in evaluating whether congressional
accommodations of conflicting constitutional claims represent ra-
tional interpretations of the fourteenth amendment, the Court
should examine the nature of the opposing interests closely. In
principle, the Court should recognize a distinction between enact-
ments that expand the scope of Court-articulated rights, even at
the expense of other rights, and enactments that create entirely
new categories of constitutional rights that are in conflict with ex-
isting rights. The Equal Access Act is an example of the former,
while the Human Life Bill is an example of the latter. Such a dis-
tinction would allow the Court to give Congress' enforcement
power its due without thereby abdicating the Court's own constitu-
tional role.178
VI. CONCLUSION
One hundred and fifty years ago, de Tocqueville observed the
peculiarly American phenomenon that nearly all questions of polit-
ics eventually are decided as questions of law.179 This phenomenon
177. The manner in which Congress could translate regulatory interests into individual
rights is demonstrated by the "peaceful parks" example posed earlier in this Article. See
supra note 123. Faced with such a deferential judicial stance, Congress could declare that
individuals have a constitutional right to peaceful parks, and then balance that right against
other individuals' rights to demonstrate in public parks. In this manner, Congress effectively
could overrule or dilute Supreme Court constitutional decisions that, in Congress' view, ac-
corded too little weight to opposing regulatory interests.
178. In retrospect, this distinction may explain Mitchell, the only recent case in which
the Court struck down an exercise of Congress' enforcement power. See 400 U.S. 112 (1970);
supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. In Mitchell, Congress sought to grant eighteen-
year-old citizens the right to vote, in effect creating a new "suspect class." In doing so,
Congress sought to override the constitutional grant of power to the states to set voting
qualifications. See 400 U.S. at 280-81. The right that Congress created was not anchored in
previous Court decisions. The interest that Congress overrode, on the other hand, was pro-
tected explicitly by the text of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Under the
distinction posed here, the congressional enactment challenged in Mitchell would not pass a
rationality review because it resulted both in the creation of an entirely new constitutional
right and in a balancing of that new right in a way that subordinated explicit, Court-articu-
lated rights.
179. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (1945).
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is even more pronounced today, and it has become increasingly dif-
ficult to defend as a commitment to the rule of law or to the rights
of minorities, as the realm of constitutional law threatens to over-
whelm the domain of democratic self-government. 180 The as yet
unexplored reaches of Congress' power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment provide a vehicle for overcoming this constitutional
malaise. Today, when constitutional rights touching upon religion,
privacy, association, and discrimination overlap at every turn, an
enhanced congressional role in adjudicating these disputes seems
especially desirable. Measures such as the Equal Access Act and
the Human Life Bill may be criticized roundly as illegitimate
politicizations of law. Today's larger problem, however, is not the
politicization of law but the legalization of politics. Although such
measures may or may not represent valid exercises of Congress'
authority under the rights in conflict theory, that theory, as out-
lined in this Article, presents a promising response to today's
problem.
180. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981).
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